Methods
In order to have realistic and well-defined expectations from this procedure, a facility-wide quantified census can be carried out.This census is key in elucidating normal functioning capacity and capacity that can be utilized in a surge.
A census was carried out by an assigned evaluation team for each facility. These teams quantified the normal functioning capacity, and then, estimated the potential conversion of this non-essential medical care space, based on the characteristics of the spaces available as noted above. These data then were compiled to provide surge capacity data for each facility. In conjunction with the census, each facility of the NYIHP created a committee for updating its respective disaster plan, which includes the surge capacity plan. Through the direction of these committees, the aforementioned methods to identify and increase surge capacity were applied. Specific plans of mobilization and creation of surge capacity were chosen by consensus in committee.
Challenges to standing infrastructure have provided certain lessons for those creating protocols and upgrading facilities in preparation for a potential public health incident.
As an example, consider the events of the Rhode Island nightclub fire of 2003. This particular tragedy quickly flooded the area's community hospitals with a large number of patients, many of them critical, which superceded these hospitals' capacities. Key to the response was the triaging of critical patients and timely interventions employed for their stabilization. This required mobilization of extra space, staff, and supplies. Following inter-facility communication, some patients were transferred to referral burn centers, thus freeing space and resources for the care of the abundance of less critically ill patients. The responses to this incident provides a case and point of the mobilization of a surge capacity and utilization of regional resources to re-establish a sustainable state of function. 3, 4 The demands on a health delivery system by a limited event like the one in Rhode Island pale in comparison to the potential of a regional or expansive public health event. "While some mass casualty incidents may follow the pattern of an intense, short-time peak of activity, others (e.g., bioterrorism incidents) will present the community and health system with rapidly increasing demands that plateau and have to be addressed for days to weeks." 5 The recent events of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic and later Hurricane Katrina documented the contrast of more enduring challenges to healthcare delivery capacity. The SARS epidemic not only required healthcare providers to diagnose and treat waves of those affected by a new pathologic entity, but the institution of isolation space and precautions for the containment of the infectious disease were critical for overall public health. The flooding following Hurricane Katrina necessitated the evacuation and closure of healthcare facilities in New Orleans, and a simultaneous need for health services for the thousands of displaced persons who suffered from exposure, trauma, infections, and/or exacerbations of chronic illnesses. 6 Every aspect of hospital functions becomes strained during a public health incident, and as a result, the ability to maintain adequate space in hospitals to provide patient care may be compromised. 7 In order to mitigate this possibility, a predetermined plan of action for a time of need will improve the effectiveness of a hospital's response. Through a process of critical self-evaluation, planning, and development, NYIHP, with grant funding from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC DOH), has attempted to address these issues within its individual facilities and to negotiate a cooperative response plan for the hospitals involved. This article documents the development, implementation, and integration of a surge capacity plan within Central Brooklyn hospitals. It is noted that medical supplies, staffing, and support services also are aspects of a response to a surge in the number of patients, but are beyond the scope of this article, which limits itself to the details of physical capacity.
Results
The results for the inventories of the Central Brooklyn NYIHP facilities can be seen in Tables 1-3 . The estimated overall surge capacity for the NYIP facilities including the KJMC nursing home network is 1,222 acute care beds, representing a 24% surge capacity.
Kings County Hospital Center
Following the results obtained through the inventory, the Surge Capacity Committee determined that further capacity was needed above and beyond the conversion of nonessential units. After an evaluation of potential space, a decommissioned ward within the Kings County Hospital Center was found to be a candidate for providing additional capacity. As Kings County Hospital Center has continued to modernize, it has moved from its historic wards and moved to new facilities that are adjacent to the old ones. During the 1980s, the now decommissioned 4 th floor of A building (A42) had been converted into an isolation ward during the epidemic of tuberculosis in the immunocompromised patients of that time. The medical gases and negative pressure systems continued to be in functional status despite its abandonment. The rooms were accessorized with beds, mattresses, bedding, and tables. An upgrade of the information technology on the unit was executed. It was determined that in the event of an activation of a reserve unit like A42, a thorough inspection of the functionality and safety be completed prior to the transfer of patients into the unit. A protocol was proposed to activate the unit, which included facility management, preparing the space, respiratory service checking the function of medical gases, housekeeping preparing the rooms, basic servicing, assigning nursing staff, infection control performing inspection, information technology assessing the phone lines, security checks, and safety checks for hazards. For this procedure to occur, the Committee estimated that it could be completed within 72 hours. The 48 isolation beds that exist in the inpatient wards would be mobilized within 48 hours by transferring non-isolation unnecessarily admitted to negative pressure rooms. For further isolation capacity needs, the conversion of a ward in the active inpatient facility to an isolation unit would occur. This would be carried out by transferring the unit's patients to other wards and using HEPA filters. 12 The total amount of isolation beds available according to these plans is 78, with a goal of being mobilized within 72 hours.
University Hospital Brooklyn, SUNY Downstate Medical Center
The UHB identified a potential resource in its outpatient department, which is located on the first floor of the hospital. The series of suites of outpatient clinics would be utilized for inpatient care. In addition, the post-anesthesia intensive care unit, catheterization laboratory, endoscopy suite, and ambulatory surgery suite could be converted to Table 2 -University Hospital at Brooklyn, State University of New York Downstate Medical Center, Brooklyn, New York-Inventory of facility physical capacity including bed counts in each unit with potential to become an inpatient unit. A census of negative pressure isolation bed capacity as well as ventilator capacity are included. provide staffed, in-patient care. The outpatient rehabilitation unit located in the basement of the hospital was identified as a secondary space for potential surge capacity. In the case of necessity, rehabilitation services would be terminated and the space could be prepared to receive patients. As the rehabilitation unit is not an active medical ward, patient room accessories and staff would be procured. The Committee determined that this unit would require a similar time frame and activation procedure as noted for A42 in KCH. In addition to native isolation capacity, an inpatient ward potentially could be converted to an isolation ward, again with the use of HEPA filters.
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Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center
In addition to the census results of KJMC in Table 3 , the bed counts from the nursing homes affiliated with KJMC are to be noted. In accord with the census trends gathered from the nursing homes for the past 25 years, the vacancy at any given time was estimated at 5%. The specific types of care provided at each nursing home were made available to the hospital network, but for NYIHP inventory purposes, only ventilator capable beds were included. Thereby, a conservative estimate of the true potential capacity within the network was maintained. With a total number of 290 ventilator capable beds, the availability would be approximately 15 beds at any given time. The beds in the affiliated nursing homes are actively staffed beds and a goal to make them available for transfers within 72 hours was proposed. These beds are not to be considered acute care beds, but are able to provide stable needs of select patients. It also should be noted that the nursing home network has no inherent isolation capacity. During the planning process, it was decided that it would not be feasible to require isolation capability of the nursing home network during a state of emergency.This decision was based on the unfamiliarity of the staff with required precautions and the inherent susceptibility some nursing home patients have to infectious diseases.
Kingsboro Psychiatric Center
An internal census of KPC resulted in an inventory of 290 inpatient beds. These beds are not staffed or accessorized for medical inpatients and are reserved specifically for mental health inpatients. Yet, the significant amount of available space within the facility provides a flexible reserve within NYIHP. It was projected that patients from the network of NYIHP hospitals with medical needs met and without other potential shelter, as well as staff requiring shelter, may be able to utilize the space available in KPC.
To mobilize the available physical space within this facility to provide for basic needs, bedding and Doffit Kits were acquired, and 350 cots are held in reserve. This facility's niche may be employed when its facility and staff are called on to provide psychiatric counseling and respite for NYIHP staff and the central Brooklyn community, as well as providing family and social work assistance. Plans include the use of this facility to provide a role as a referral service.
Discussion
A public health incident may require capacity that takes priority over the day-to-day use of resources of a healthcare facility. Establishing a plan to guide and prioritize the mobilization of additional capacity of a facility is likely to produce a more effective response to such an incident. There are multiple ways in which capacity theoretically can be increased, and there are examples of the use of these methods documented in actual events. Hospitals receiving patients from the Rhode Island nightclub fire mobilized surge capacity, making medical wards available through discharge and transfer of inpatients. These actions were followed by the conversion of some wards into intensive care units to care for the surge in the number of burn patients. 4 The process of converting or creating wards was utilized particularly during the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong and Toronto to increase isolation capabilities. 8, 9 An understanding of these and other specific methods to increase capacity is helpful in developing a surge capacity plan for a facility or region. A primary response that facilities can employ to mobilize resources in a time of need is the redistribution of capacity from nonessential medical care to critical and inpatient care. A hospital may discontinue certain aspects of its normal activities such as closing ambulatory clinics and canceling elective medical procedures, thus augmenting the capacity to deal with a surge of admissions. The designation of the surge space, which is created by this process, may be determined by the characteristics of that respective area, including location, staffing, and patient monitoring specifications. The determination of "nonessential" medical care is subjective and may depend on the magnitude of strain on a facility's resources. In NYIHP hospitals, ambulatory care clinics as well as elective procedures including surgery, cardiac catheterization, endoscopy, etc., were included as nonessential medical care.
The process described in the NYIHP disaster plan by which nonessential units are converted to functional surge capacity is helpful. When a facility requires mobilization, the senior staff of a unit will receive notification from hospital administrators that the particular unit is to be converted for an incoming surge. At that time, procedures in progress are expedited and the space is cleared of patients who do not receive further monitoring or intervention. Then, the staff of that area prepares the space for the reception of inpatients by ensuring the existence and function of stretchers, medical gases, and monitoring equipment. Once the space is prepared by senior staff in the unit, patients may be admitted or transferred into the ward. In the NYIHP plan, the time and work required for the cessation of nonessential care and the conversion to usable inpatient capacity is taken into account.
Similarly, a second response of increasing surge capacity is based on redistributing resources. This response entails the discharge or transfer of those admitted patients whose care can be provided in other locations (i.e., nursing home or home care). Upon activation of the NYIHP disaster plan, the hospital administration notifies each ward's senior physician, nursing, and social work staff to take a census of their respective ward. Together, these staff will review their census and determine which patients can be transferred or discharged to alternative facilities when their medical needs are met. They then report back to the hospital Integrated Plan to Augment Surge Capacity Cooperative regional planning by healthcare facilities may allow for a more streamlined response and request for resources. Agreements could include staff and supply sharing while describing expected channels for communication and resource reallocation during an incident. These agreements also could address the mechanism for interacting with jurisdictional authorities within the region to ensure that patients can be transferred from one facility to another in a timely manner. Inter-regional agreements also are encouraged and may be facilitated by state health authorities. 10 The cooperation and communication between the NYIHP facilities is facilitated by the structure of the hospital administration during a disaster. Each facility's disaster plans are initiated with the establishment of an executive Incident Command System Model. 14 Basically, this model creates a Central Command Center that is made up of administrators responsible for the distribution of resources, including capacity. The Command Center determines the cessation of nonessential medical care and mobilization of surge capacity. It is these command centers that communicate with other NYIHP and regional facilities concerning the available capacity that exists. Communication between the command centers of the different facilities is provided by emergency radio channels that are reserved for this purpose. Using radio communications, information would be exchanged concerning bed availability data, isolation requirements, and other pertinent information. During the preparatory process, each facility's protocols and surge capacity have been publicized to the other NYIHP facilities. The mobilization of resources occurs in parallel, and further redistribution of resources is possible through the use of inter-facility transfers.
In theory, the NYIHP hospitals and their staff have benefited from the surge capacity goal set by the NYC DOH. The hospitals applied methods in parallel to identify inherent capacity, devise options for augmenting this capacity, and develop algorithms for surge mobilization to be utilized when needed. Estimations, though conservative, were used to determine the exact bed capacity of units not normally used for inpatient care. The NYIHP network has had multiple drills with mock patients to train staff and assess the disaster plans' functionality, but the mobilization of surge capacity in the NYIHP network never has occurred on a large scale. This limits the verifiability of the data in this article. A full-scale drill with mobilization of surge capacity throughout the NYIHP would be a useful adjunct. The benefits noted in this article, though qualitative, should not be understated. Through these methods, the staff educated and prepared itself in the management of a public health incident, prepared a reserve ward in KCH, and delineated a disaster surge capacity plan for each facility and for the NYIHP network.
Isolation Capacity
From a public health perspective, the most concerning communicable diseases are those that can be aerosolized. These require airborne isolation with negative pressure ventilation to prevent transmission. Airborne isolation is the strictest form of isolation and is a space-intensive requirement of a facility. In Hong Kong, "the SARS epidemic exposed subadministrators within 60 minutes with the current and projected bed availability data based on potential discharges. The decision to discharge is based on physician judgment concerning the needs of the patient in relation to the resources that can be made available to the patient outside the hospital. This decision is to be made in the context of the specific public health incident and remains a largely subjective calculation. Ideally, through this process, the inpatients' dispositions would provide basic medical needs at home or in an alternative space or facility, i.e., a nursing home, and thereby, increase bed availability. 10 A third response to increase bed availability in a facility is to build additional functional space to supplement capacity. The construction of medical units has been required in prolonged public health incidents such as the SARS epidemic in Ontario and Hong Kong. Once a need and available space is identified, wards can be built and accessorized rapidly for inpatient care and airborne isolation within days to weeks. Though, because of these intrinsic delays in relation to a surge, this option results in a response that trails the peak of surge capacity needs. This characteristic makes it an intervention that is not particularly helpful in shortlived incidents. An alternative to the creation of new units in the midst of an acute need is the creation of wards to be held in reserve prior to that need. These wards would not be used in the daily function of the facility, but would be capable of being activated for inpatient care. This entity typically is not found in healthcare facilities currently because unused wards are not economically feasible to maintain. A reserve ward is not a cost-effective use of space in hospital functioning in a competitive environment. Yet, such a unit may be an asset to a facility receiving a surge of patients.
A last resort for accommodating surge capacity demands would be a facility using its hallways and other available, unprepared space to care for patients. This is the response a surge capacity plan is attempting to avoid, and it may portend a further degradation of care. This would be evident especially in the case of an infectious disease outbreak, where isolation precautions are considered to have a high priority.
There is limited communication between the units of the current medical delivery system, and many hospitals generally operate without interaction with their counterparts in a region. These characteristics may be related to the competitive environment of health care in the US. During a public health incident, poor coordination may lead to a suboptimal healthcare response when the needs and resources are mismatched across a region. In this case, certain defined relationships, even between competing health service entities providing for mutual assistance in extreme conditions, might be beneficial. Consider the improved effectiveness of a response to a multiple-alarm fire when numerous fire departments respond and are directed to act from a central command, in contrast to the response in which the departments act independently. 13 Recalling recent events in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, the ability to transfer patients through a flexible and redundant regional command and communication structure may improve the effects of a regional disaster management plan. 6 The amount of isolation capacity varies between facilities and may not meet the demands of real events. As demonstrated by hospitals during the SARS epidemic, highly efficient, particulate air (HEPA) filters have been propounded as a means for converting regular care beds to airborne isolation. "Hospitals dealt with the isolation surge requirement in different ways: some installed temporary facilities using HEPA filtration units, whereas others elected to construct permanent banks of rooms with dedicated ventilation systems." 11 As noted previously, airborne isolation units may be built in a time of need or as a reserve. Yet, the conversion of existing beds without negative pressure ventilation to airborne isolation with the use of HEPA filters potentially is a less time-intensive response. Following this precedent, NYIHP included HEPA filter conversion of inpatient wards as a potential intervention in the case of overwhelming isolation capacity needs.
Conclusions
In response to a challenge by NYC DOH, the Central Brooklyn NYIHP hospitals have identified and augmented the surge capacity in their facilities, and have devised protocols for the concerted mobilization of that surge capacity in a time of need. The surge capacity plan of the NYIHP facilities is an example of how effort can be organized within the multifaceted American health system. It joins a community hospital, a university hospital, a private hospital with nursing home affiliations, and a state mental healthcare facility into a cooperative effort. This process could result in the creation of plans within and between facilities that may augment their ability to respond to a public health incident. stantial weaknesses in hospital design and environment. Wards are overcrowded and facilities outdated. Before the epidemic, beds were generally placed close together; in order to cope with the increasing caseload. Ward design is often inappropriate for the management of communicable disease." 8 The current model for managing communicable disease is the distribution of isolation capabilities throughout multiple hospitals in a region. As a result, expertise in the management of the communicable diseases is also expected to be distributed throughout the healthcare system. This places the responsibility of infectious disease management, including isolation responsibilities, on individual hospitals. Providing for a surge of patients requiring isolation remains a challenging part of the disaster management plan of a facility and of a region.
Meeting the demand for isolation capacity in the face of a communicable disease epidemic depends on the ability to mobilize inherent isolation capacity of a facility and on any potential augmentation of that capacity. Often, at any given time in a hospital, a significant amount of isolation capacity is being occupied by inpatients that do not require airborne isolation. An available inventory of all negative pressure rooms within a facility is requisite. In a time of need, the mobilization of this capacity occurs by first identifying the inherent isolation capacity occupied by patients not requiring airborne isolation. The transfer of these patients to free this space follows the same scheme that was previously described for the transfer of patients with medical needs met, with physicians and nurses coordinating the redistribution of patients in order to maximize the availability of existing isolation capacity.
